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Abstract 
Like other modern day process industries, most cement manufacturing operations are 
continuously sorting after state-of-the-art failure identification and analysis approaches that 
can help avert the reoccurrence of failures, owing to the huge costs of downtime associated 
with critical plant assets such as the rotary kilns. Research-based investigation of the root 
causes of high impact failures of critical industrial assets have been dominated by the use of 
complex mathematical methods for analysing experimentally and numerically simulated 
scenarios. While the academic contributions of such approaches is highly commendable, the 
potential of deploying them to the industry as well as their ability to simulate experiential 
learning is significantly lower than when “real life” industrial case studies are used. Through 
the application of a fully integrated cement plant located in Northern Nigeria as case study; 
this paper employs two popular risk analysis techniques (fault tree analysis and reliability 
block diagram) to detect the causal factors as well as their interrelations of a chronic rotary 
kiln refractory brick failure. Unlike the previous plant-based investigations which 
continuously attributed the failure causes to refractory brick design/manufacturing, the 
current approach provides a detailed, almost macroscopic dimension of vulnerabilities in 
maintenance, operations and quality practices in the plant. Through a combination of theory 
and immense practical knowledge of the case study plant, the current investigation team also 
provided several vital and realistic recommendations that could eliminate or significantly 
reduce the possibility of kiln refractory brick failure in the plant. The cornerstone of this 
paper is not to undermine the currently used Apollo method of root cause failure analysis in 
this cement plant, but rather to provide a complementary holistic approach to the 
investigation 
 of critical failures. Therefore, the robustness of in-plant failure analysis can be enhanced 
through effective integration of the individual approaches. 




For so many decades, a significant number of process plants have relied heavily on rotary 
kilns for the achievement of their manufacturing objectives. Rotary kilns can be described as 
calcinations devices that facilitate chemical or physical transformations by subjecting 
materials to very high temperatures (also known as pyroprocessing). A classical example of 
rotary kiln operation is in the production of clinker (the main ingredient for manufacturing 
cement), whereby pulverised raw materials (mainly limestone, alumina, sand and iron ore) 
mixture undergoes calcinations at temperatures in excess of 1500oC [1]. Other vital industrial 
operations that involve rotary kilns include the production of lime, iron pellets, alumina, etc. 
[2-3]. Just like every other critical industrial asset, rotary kiln system functions are often 
associated with various performance standards including runtime (e.g. continuous operation 
or required availability), physical integrity, operational performance quality and tolerance, etc 
[4-6]. The satisfactory achievement of these performance standards is considered system 
success while deviations from one or more of them are termed system failure. To further 
illustrate this, Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of failure and success as described in 
an earlier study by Rausand and Oien [6].  According to the figure, once an asset is 
commissioned, performance targets are set (set target) so as to monitor operational success or 
failure. In order to minimise disruptions to day-to-day operations, the asset performance is 
sometimes allowed to float within a certain limit (stretch and lower acceptable targets). On 
the one hand, the region between the stretch and lower acceptable target represents the 
success region. The point at which performance begins to drop below the acceptable limit is 
considered failure and the region representing such performances over time is the failure 
region.  
In general, both success and failures always provide immense lessons through which 
organisations can either replicate favourable performances or avoid the reoccurrence of 
previous errors. While literatures based on conventional teachings strongly advocated the 
 strengths of learning from internal and external successes [7-8], relatively recent studies [9-
11] have argued that organizations are more likely to learn from failures than success. This is 
perhaps based on the premise that splotches caused by failures are more likely to trigger the 
conditions required for sustainable experiential learning [12-13].  
Over the years, researchers have continuously attempted to investigate the root causes [14-
16] of engineering failures using different approaches. For instance, Otegui et al. [17] 
conducted a case study based investigation of the common root causes of weld joints failures 
in industrial pressure vessels using finite element and mechanical stress analyses. Based on 
the investigation of three distinct cases, the study [17] deduced that increasing the thickness 
of welds as a means of enhancing the factor of safety significantly increased cyclic stress due 
to excess pressure vessels weights. In an attempt to further understand the behaviour and root 
causes of crack failure in critical industrial machines such as turbines, the studies by Ataya 
and Ahmed [18]; Silveira et al. [19] and Sz et al. [20] respectively examined blade cracks in 
wind, aircraft and steam turbines. In the former study on blade cracks [18], 98 wind turbine 
blades were investigated and it was observed that transverse cracks are often associated with 
the high fatigue loaded regions of the blade trailing edge. Through the application of various 
health monitoring techniques including stress analysis (mechanical and thermal); natural 
frequency calculations; metallurgical examination and fractography, Silveira et al. [19] 
attributed blade failures in high pressure turbines of aircrafts to thermal-mechanical fatigue. 
On the other hand, study by Sz et al. [20] on a 350 MW steam turbine ascertained that 
excessive tolerances between blade root and root fastening tree leads to stress concentration 
in the blade root which can initiate cracks. In other studies, Chen et al. [21] investigated the 
fault features of cracked planetary gears using analytical mesh stiffness models while Escobar 
et al. [22] detected stress corrosion cracks in the assembly bolts of submersible pumps using 
mechanical and optical test methods. Similarly, Domazet et al. [1] developed finite element 
models in order to study the stress distribution and the location of fatigue cracks in cement 
mill girth gears. Murugan and Ramasamy [23] used statistical methods to analyse power 
transformer failures with respect to voltage levels, geographical locations and component 
failures. 
As valuable and relevant as the findings from these failure detection methodologies [17-23] 
are their thumping computational and mathematical requirements sometimes hamper 
deployment to the industry. Additionally, they are mostly based on experimental and 
theoretically simulated scenarios which may or may not directly represent “real life” 
 industrial scenarios.  Based on these premises, the continuous application of engineering 
analysis techniques that can systematically show the causal relationships that exist between 
complex industrial events (success or failure) is long overdue. Fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
reliability block diagrams (RBD) are some of the most illustrative and commonly used 
performance assessment techniques within the last five decades. Their applications span 
across various industries including nuclear, aerospace, military, manufacturing, oil and gas, 
etc. Purba [24] used fuzzy based reliability approaches for evaluating the basic events of a 
nuclear power plant fault tree. Similarly, Lavasani et al. [25] discussed the applicability of 
FTA to oil and gas offshore pipelines by analysing the root causes of a Deethanizer failure 
which identified fire, explosion and toxic gas release as potential hazards. Cong et al. [26] 
also proposed FTA for on-line repair of damaged pipes in petrochemical plants. Other studies 
[13, 27] have also used FTA and RBD techniques for analysing historic engineering 
catastrophes such as Fukushima nuclear disaster, Titanic, BP Texas city incident, Chernobyl 
disaster, Bhopal disaster, and NASA space shuttle Columbia accident.  
It is undeniable that significant amount of work has been performed with FTA and RBD 
techniques. However, very few cases of their applications in vital manufacturing plants such 
as cement, steel, automotive, textiles, etc., currently exists in the literature. Some of the few 
works include the application of FTA for assessing premature failures in the induced draft fan 
of a cement process plant, which was attributed to the inadequate insulation of the induction 
motor winding [28]. Li et al. [29] also used FTA to analyse various failure modes associated 
with cement rotary kiln axis alignment system. More recently, Gharahasanlou et al. [30] 
showed how FTA can be used to detect the failures associated with the crushing plant and 
mixing bed hall of a cement plant. Since the cement rotary kiln is the single most valuable 
asset of any fully integrated cement process plant, the current study is based on the 
combination of FTA and RBD for the analysis of a chronic rotary kiln insulation brick failure 
of a cement plant located in Northern Nigeria (ASH Cement PLC). The paper presents how 
the application of FTA and RBD can systematically show the causal relation between the 





 2. Overview of fault tree analysis and reliability block diagrams  
The concepts of FTA and RBD have existed for decades and are well-known across various 
industries especially nuclear and aerospace. Despite the long standing establishment of these 
valuable engineering failure analysis tools, research studies [27-28] indicate that their 
applications have been significantly skewed towards systems design failure analysis and very 
little in the area of industrial asset operation and maintenance management. Through the 
application of a cement manufacturing company as case study, the current paper attempts to 
provide a holistic approach to failure analysis using FTA and RBD. Just like any other 
engineering tool, FTA and RBD have enjoyed their fair share of criticism particularly in the 
area of not being able to capture interdependence among failure modes, and reducing 
complex problems into simple root cause analysis. However, recent research has also 
provided guidelines on how to overcome these limitations as well as provided best practice in 
constructing the FTA and RBD models [31]. Also, a recent study by Labib and Read [32] 
shows how to integrate the FTA and RBD modelling to multiple criteria decision making 
techniques such the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and demonstrated the use of such a 
hybrid approach in studying the Hurricane Katrina Disaster. It is therefore hoped that the 
approach discussed in this paper will further enhance existing methods, so that chronic 
failures in this plant as well as others can be effectively minimised.   
 
2.1 Fault tree analysis (FTA)  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic “top-down” failure analysis technique that gradually 
progresses deductively from the emergence of an unwanted event (also known as the “top 
event”) to the identification of the causal factors (also known as “basic events”) of that 
particular unwanted event [27].  Besides identifying the root causes of the unwanted event, 
FTAs can equally show the causal relationships (using logic gates) that exist between them 
which can help both equipment designers and operators understand how components/systems 
can fail. The construction of a typical fault tree commences with the “top event” which is 
usually chosen based on its criticality to the studied system. Once the “top event” is defined, 
the next stage of the construction is to determine all its possible causes and then connecting 
them with appropriate logic gates. The events of a typical fault tree can be connected using a 
variety of logic gates including AND, OR, k-out-of-n, exclusive OR, inhibit, priority AND, 
NOT, etc. However, since the majority of problems can be accurately modelled using either 
 AND or OR gates, the current study will similarly be restricted to the application of AND and 
OR logic gates. Table 1 shows the different logic gates and symbols that will be used in this 
paper. In addition to graphically showing the relationships that exist between the various 
causal factors, the probability of occurrence of the “top-event” can also be obtained. This is 
usually achieved by estimating the probability of occurrence of the logic gates’ output fault 
events using Equations (1) and (2) [30];  
 OR gate 
𝑃(𝑿𝑂𝑅 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) = 1 −  ∏ (1 − 𝑃(𝑿𝑘))
𝑛
𝑘=1                                                   (1) 
 
Where n denotes the number of input fault events, 𝑃(𝑿𝑂𝑅 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)  is the probability of 
occurrence of OR gate’s output fault event  𝑿𝑂𝑅 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒  and 𝑃(𝑿𝑘)  is the probability of 
occurrence of input fault event 𝑿𝑘 (for k = 1, 2, 3, …, n).  
 
 AND gate 
𝑃(𝑿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝑿𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1       (2) 
Where 𝑃(𝑿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)  is the probability of occurrence of AND gate’s output fault event 
𝑿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
2.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
A reliability block diagram (RBD) is a logical representation that either depicts the 
combinations of component failures that would lead to system failure or combinations of 
adequately functioning components that keep the system functioning [33-34]. In a typical 
RBD, each block signifies a functional component while any failure is indicated by simply 
omitting the block that represents the failed component from the diagram. A system 
represented by an RBD that has at least one path from input to output continues to remain in a 
functional state and fails once the connection between input and output is completely 
interrupted [33]. Depending on the system complexity and level of redundancy available, 
 RBDs can have series or parallel configurations. Unlike fault trees that solely focus on the 
failure combinations of a system, RBDs are particularly concerned with the different 
combinations of the components in a system that will lead to system functionality [34-37]. 
During system analysis, an equivalent RBD that indicates system success can be extracted 
from a fault tree that shows system failure and vice versa. The study by Labib and Harris [27] 
has already provided clear guidelines on how to effectively convert fault trees to RBDs and 
vice versa. Additional guidelines on the construction of fault trees and RBDs including ways 
of overcoming their respective limitations are also provided in a study by Labib [31]. Hence, 
the equivalent RBDs developed in the current study are mental models extracted from the 
fault trees so that the visualisation of the different relationships that exist between the causal 
factors can be simplified.  It is crucial to note that the robustness of such techniques with 
respect to change in data inputs can be assessed at two levels. The first level relates to 
whether the probability value of each factor has been accurately verified. The second level is 
about whether the mental model covers all aspects related to the casual factors. We argue that 
the multidisciplinary nature and experience of the team members involved in the 
development of the model can ensure that the peer review process enhances the robustness of 
the technique. So the focus of our approach here tends to be more biased towards the second 
rather than the first level of assessment. In other words, we agree with the argument posed by 
Apostolakis [38] in that the importance of risk-informed rather than risk-based decision 
making should be emphasised. 
 
3. The case study 
A case study research principally entails the analysis of historical data drawn from various 
sources of evidence that represent previous or present occurrence(s) within an organisation 
[39-41]. Because the scopes of case study-based research works are immensely specific, they 
enable the development of detailed understanding of what is to be studied [42] which can 
significantly ease the deployment of the concepts to the field. Some authors have questioned 
the possibilities of generalising case study based research findings as well as the quantity of 
data often involved [43-44]. However, their ability to simplify the visualisation of “real life” 
experiences is very vital for the analysis of complex engineering failures [45-46].       
In the current paper, the case study is a cement manufacturing plant located in the Northern 
region of Nigeria (ASH Cement PLC), which has been producing approximately one million 
 metric tonnes of cement per year for over three decades. Cement production in this plant is 
achieved through the aid of two similarly configured continuously-operating production lines. 
Each of the production lines is independently equipped with a raw milling, kiln firing, coal 
grinding, cement grinding and cement packing/discharge stations. While each of the 
production lines are configured to be significantly independent, common equipment such as 
raw materials storage silos, cement storage silos, clinker storage silos, utilities, etc still exist. 
In general, the success or failure of any fully integrated cement process plant is judged by the 
reliability of its rotary kiln(s), since it produces the main ingredient of cement (i.e. clinker). 
Hence the rotary kiln is the single most important asset in any cement manufacturing plant. In 
this plant, each of the rotary kilns has a daily production capacity of 1100 tons of clinker and 
a dimension of 4 m (diameter) x 72 m (length). The temperature within the rotary kilns is in 
excess of 1500oC so as to adequately effect the combination of the clinker components, 
especially lime and silica. This high temperature is achieved through the combustion of dual 
fuel (60% heavy fuel oil and 40% lignite) supplied by a centrally installed high pressure 
pyro-jet burner. In order to optimise heat generated in the rotary kiln as well as reduce the 
amount of heat radiated to the steel kiln shell, special heat insulating bricks are used to line 
the entire kiln interior.      
3.1 Incidence report and events sequence 
The incident analysed in the current study occurred on line 1 cement rotary kiln. In order to 
enhance proper understanding of the kiln operation process, the sequence of actions that were 
taken (from high shell radiation detection to kiln shutdown) as a result of the hotspot on the 
kiln shell are provided here;   
 On 27 April 2012, captured thermal images displayed by the plant supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) system showed that cement rotary kiln 1 was 
experiencing high shell radiation (external shell temperature reached 480oC within 2 
hours) around the 23 m mark, which is above the acceptable threshold. Figure 2 
shows the hotspot at the 23 m mark of kiln 1 as recorded by the SCADA system. In 
Figure 2, LTZ, BZ and UTZ respectively refer to the lower transition, burning and 
upper transition zones of the kiln. 
 A confirmatory assessment was then conducted using a handheld device and the 
results also indicated excessive kiln 1 shell temperatures around 21-23 m area. 
  Historical operational data (date versus temperature profile) shows that kiln 1 shell 
temperature reached or exceeded the 400oC upper threshold 15 different times within 
six weeks as indicated by Figure 3. 
 Based on both SCADA and manual shell scan, the kiln operator was then instructed to 
initiate kiln shutdown procedure, which commenced by reducing liquid fuel quantity 
from 3230 - 3100 L/h while still maintaining the same raw material feed rate of 74 
ton/h. This action significantly reduced kiln temperature since there will be more feed 
than fuel in the kiln. The solid fuel (lignite) mill was then stopped at 2400 hrs and the 
solid fuel injection rate was reduced to 2 ton/h. After significant fuel reduction, the 
raw material feed rate was then reduced from 74 to 68 ton/h. Correspondingly, the 
rotary kiln speed was reduced from 1.78 to 1.4 rev/min which also led to a reduction 
of the induced draft fan speed from 700 to 650 rev/min. This gradual kiln parameters 
(kiln feed, fuel, kiln speed and induced draft fan speed) reduction continued until kiln 
shutdown at 0600 hrs on 28 April 2012.   
 After 24 hrs of cooling, kiln 1 detailed internal inspection commenced on 29 April 
2012 at 0900 hrs. The internal inspection revealed that a rectangular refractory brick 
(0.4 m x 0.8 m) had fallen out from a point that was 23 m from the discharge end of 
kiln 1 as shown in Figure 4. Other observations from the internal inspection included 
significantly reduced brick thickness around the area. 
 
3.2 Impacts of the incident 
The cement plant used for this case study sits in a sold-out market which implies that the 
cement demand in that geographical area significantly exceeds supply. Hence, any shortfalls 
in the cement production/despatch will instantly result to a negative impact on the company’s 
profitability and competitiveness. Over the 15-day downtime period, approximately £850k 
loss was directly incurred by the company. This amount includes £680k in lost clinker 
production plus £170k for spares (e.g. bricks, welding electrodes, bolts, nuts, seals, etc.), 
labour and hired 150 ton mobile crane.  
Besides the estimated direct costs of the failure on sales and maintenance, other aspects of the 
failure that were not estimated but may have significant long term consequences such as risks 
of potential litigations from major stakeholders as a result of disrupted cement deliveries 
arising from enormous despatch backlogs after kiln start up. The economic viability of the 
 immediate community may also be impacted negatively since the dominant business 
activities in the area are immensely associated with construction materials. Changes to raw 
materials (e.g. fuel, iron ore, etc.) supply lead time may adversely affect the credit standing of 
some suppliers with their finance institutions, which could have knock-on effects on the cost 
and reliability of the supply process. In general, organisations that experience such major 
manufacturing incidents on frequent basis stand the risk of losing their reputation which may 
lead to loss of loyal customers to competitors.  
 
3.3 Current plant-based failure analysis approach and findings 
In practice, the development of a robust and cost-effective asset management strategy usually 
entails the integration of several well-known maintenance philosophies. For instance, reactive 
maintenance (RM) could be allocated to non-critical plant items such as toilet lightings. 
Planned preventive maintenance (PPM) activities on the other hand can be reserved for plant 
items with known or predictable failure times while condition-based maintenance (CBM) can 
be dedicated to extremely critical and randomly failing plant items. However, irrespective of 
the particular asset management strategy adopted by a company, the competitiveness and 
profitability of such a company is often affected by how much it is able to learn from costly 
downtimes as well as implement corrective actions that will prevent reoccurrence. Figure 5 
provides a schematic distinction between reactive and continuous improvement based asset 
management approaches. In the reactive approach, maintenance interventions such as repair 
or replace are implemented after each failure (f1, f2, f3, …, fn) whereby the continuous 
improvement based approach incorporates a root cause [47-49] failure investigation element 
after the first failure (f1) so as to prevent reoccurrence.    
 
In an attempt to trigger a paradigm shift from reactive to continuous and sustainable 
improvement based asset management, ASH cement plant also thrives to inculcate a culture 
of investigating the root causes of critical plant failures (e.g. kiln, mills, packers, crushers, 
etc.) using the Apollo RCA method [50]. In general, the main goal of any effective RCA [47-
49] is to identify failure prevention strategies through a systematic process that eventually 
eliminates blame culture while enhancing safety and overall system effectiveness [49]. The 
Apollo method of RCA is evidence-based and its process involves failure definition, 
 development of cause and effect chart, solution identification/implementation. The RCAs at 
ASH cement plant are team-based whereby failure investigations are formally conducted with 
multidisciplinary teams and a designated RCA facilitator as leader.  
For this incident, the core disciplines involved in the RCA were the kiln coach, K1 operators, 
production shift manager, K1 patrollers, production manager, maintenance manager, kiln 
section maintenance team lead, methods manager and quality manager. In order to ensure 
objectivity of the RCA process, the facilitator was the plant safety manager who is neutral to 
kiln operations. The RCA identified thermal shock due to rapid overheating/sudden cooling, 
kiln feed variations, unstable kiln coatings and high number of kiln stoppages for incidents 
(e.g. loss of power and kiln feed losses) as the probable failure causes while refractory brick 
quality was adjudged to be the main root cause. Hence refractory brick replacement was the 
recommended correction action. Just like other RCA methods, a key success factor is the 
prevention of failure reoccurrence. However, this as well as the previous RCAs for K1 brick 
failure has not achieved this aim since similar failures have hampered clinker production at 
ASH cement plant 10 times within 9 years, with each of the incidents leading to at least 14 
days of plant downtime. Based on this premise, the current study investigates the same K1 
refractory brick failure using a combination of two alternative failure analysis techniques. 
During the analysis, the same RCA team were consulted and similar plant evidences were 
used but in more detail. It is worth mentioning that the main aim of the current paper is not to 
undermine the Apollo method of RCA but rather explore the robustness of other failure 
analysis approaches such as FTA and RBD, so as to offer alternative platforms through which 
cement and other manufacturing companies can further ascertain the effectiveness of their 
existing methodologies.    
 
4. Kiln 1 Brick Failure Investigation with FTA and RBD 
Plant failure data obtained from the advanced downtime analysis program (ADAP) at ASH 
Cement Company showed that K1 refractory brick failure has occurred ten times within nine 
years with each of the failures accounting for no less than 14 days of plant downtime. Based 
on these statistics and the cost implication of the failures, it is logical to regard K1 refractory 
brick failure as chronic. A thorough review of ADAP data for the periods covering the ten K1 
refractory brick failures identified three main classes of probable causes, namely: (a) poor K1 
maintenance, (b) poor K1 operation and (c) poor K1 quality. The selection of the three 
 classes was also validated based on at least ten years of practical experience of one of the 
authors of this paper with the operations, maintenance and safety departments of ASH 
Cement Company as well as the combined industrial experiences of the plant-based 
investigation team. Figure 6 shows a global FTA of the three main probable causes. Due to 
the chronic nature of these particular failures, initial fault trees developed for all three main 
classes of probable causes were generic so that it can be used beyond the investigation of the 
current failure (especially when considering future design improvements, risk assessments, 
plant team trainings, etc.) as FTA for complex industrial processes can be time and resource 
consuming. From the generic fault trees, resultant fault trees were then generated by 
eliminating events that did not contribute to the K1 failure that occurred on 27 April 2012.         
 
4.1 Generic FTAs for K1 refractory brick failure 
In order to enhance clarity, each of the identified classes of probable causes was 
independently developed as shown in Figures 7-9. In Figure 7, a detailed analysis of plant 
data for ten K1 brick failure incidents showed that the poor maintenance probable cause (A) 
was mainly associated with K1 burner pipe misalignment (IA1). When a cement kiln burner 
pipe is misaligned, heat from the flame (approximately 1800°C) becomes skewed towards 
certain sections of the burning zone which eventually wears out the protective coatings for 
the refractory bricks at those sections. Once the coating is lost, the refractory bricks become 
subjected to direct heat from the flame which then leads to premature failure. IA1 can be due 
to either inaccurate alignment during previous shutdowns (a1) or excessive K1 vibration 
during normal operation (IA2). Based on observed plant failure data, it was ascertained that 
the main causes of the IA2 event are failure of K1 induced fan damper (IA3) or worn K1 tyre 
and support rollers (IA4). Further investigations indicated that the dominant causes of IA3 are 
programmable logic controller (PLC) failure (UA1), stiffness of induced draft fan damper 
arm due to lubricant failure (IA5) or inadequate power cylinder operating pressures (IA6). 
The lubricant failure is commonly due to a combination of excessive heat around the damper 
arm bearings (a3) and heat shield failure (a4) or ingress of dust as a result of damaged 
damper arm bearing seals (a2). The major causes of IA6 on the other hand is either failure of 
the instrument air compressor (a6) or a significant drop in the instrument air pressure due to 
leakages along the line (a5). Similarly, K1 vibrations due to worn K1 tyres/support rollers 
 (IA4) was adjudged to be caused by overheating of tyre and roller (IA7) due to cooling 
system failure (a7) or poor lubrication between tyre and support rollers (IA10).   
 
The production of high quality cement in a cost-effective manner significantly depends on 
how well the rotary kiln operational and quality parameters are managed. A slight deviation 
from any of these parameters usually leads to costly plant downtimes such as K1 refractory 
brick failure. The generic fault trees in Figures 8-9 respectively show the basic events 
associated with poor K1 operation and quality control activities. The production logs for the 
ten K1 brick incidents showed that poor operation (Figure 8) probable cause is either due to 
thermal shock (IB1) or kiln disturbance (IB2), while IB1 is a function of lack of adherence to 
K1 ramp-up (b1) and ramp-down procedures (b2). Kiln disturbance on the other hand is often 
caused by either any of the following: 
 Loss of K1 feed (IB5) due to either lack of material in silos (b3) or extraction 
difficulties (IB9) associated with air slides (b5), silo blockage (b4) or lack of 
extraction air (IB13).  
   Loss of K1 fuel (IB6) is either associated with loss of solid (lignite) fuel loss (IB10) 
or liquid (HFO) fuel loss (IB11). Further breakdown of IB10 shows that the base 
events are lignite mill failure (b8), lignite shortage (b9), lignite transport pump failure 
(b10) or lignite storage hopper failure (b11). Similarly, IB11 base events are HFO 
shortage (b12), HFO pumps failures (b13 and b14), HFO delivery pipe 
blockage/damage (b15), boiler failure (b16), steam pipe connector failure (b17) or 
damaged steam pipes (b18). 
 Loss draft (IB7) through K1 as a result of induced draft fan failure (b19). 
 Loss of K1 rotation (IB8) due to failure of K1 gearboxes (IB18 and IB19), drive 
motor failure (IB12), main drive coupling failure (b24) or loss of power (b23). 
 
Poor K1 quality (Figure 9) was adjudged to be generally associated with either inaccurate K1 
design/manufacture (IC2) or non-homogenous K1 feed (IC3). IC3 can either be related to 
poor K1 refractory specifications (UC1), poor K1 shell metal specifications during 
design/manufacture (UC2) or loss of K1 poor concentricity (UC3). Feed to K1 is a mixture of 
four main raw materials (i.e. limestone, iron ore, alumina and river sand), which must be 
 accurate metered in order to effectively produce high quality cement. The metering is 
performed by four similarly designed and configured weighing systems with exactly same 
failure modes. Hence, their common base events are load cells failure (i.e. c4, c6, c8 or c10), 
torn weigh belts (c5, c7, c9 or c10), failed tracking rollers (i.e. c12, c16, c20 or c24), belt 
tension bolts failure (i.e. c13, c17, c21 or c25), damaged tail drum pads (c14, c18, c22 or c26) 
or damaged head drum pads (c15, c19, c23 or c27).  
 
 
4.2 Resultant FTAs for K1 refractory brick failure 
The resultant fault trees displayed in Figures 10-12 are extracts from the generic fault trees 
but rather than incorporating all the possible causes of K1 failures over nine years, only the 
events that contributed to K1 refractory brick failure of 27 April 2012 were considered. It is 
vital to note that the construction of the resultant fault trees through the elimination of non-
contributory events in the generic fault trees is purely based on evidence. For instance, the 
resultant fault tree for poor maintenance (Figure 10) only consists of basic events a2-a6 while 
a1, a8-a10 and UA1-UA4 were all eliminated. These omissions were based on the 
favourability of K1 burner pipe alignment (a1) results prior to start-up after previous 
shutdown and CMMS data showed that there were no downtimes due to PLC failure (UA1) 
or worn/cracked K1 tyres and support rollers (a8-a10 and UA2-UA4).   
 
Similarly poor K1 operation resultant fault tree (Figure 11) only considered basic events b1-
b7 while events b8-b40 were all eliminated. The production log sheet for the period 
preceding the 27 April 2012 incident showed that the K1 ramp-up (b1) and ramp-down (b2) 
varied between different shift operators. The plot of K1 temperature profile over six weeks 
(Figure 3) also showed that the shift operators barely achieved the recommended K1 shell 
temperatures. Another observed loophole in K1 operation is the lack of proper management 
of K1 feeding system, owing to several instances of storage silo extraction difficulties (b4 
and b5), empty storage silos (b3) and inadequate extraction air (b6 and b7). Loss of feed to 
K1 under steady fuel and air supply implies that the possibility of premature brick failure is 
significantly increased since there is no feed to take up the excess heat. 
 
 For poor quality (Figure 12), design and manufacturing considerations such as K1 shell 
concentricity (UC1) and axial run-out (UC2) were eliminated based on the premise that the 
results of previous structural integrity measurements (Figure 13) showed maximum non-
concentricity and axial run-out values of 0.3 mm and 0.55 mm respectively, which are well 
within the acceptable limits. Once quality issues related to design/manufacturing are 
eliminated, the focal point then shifts towards non-homogeneity of the feed (IC3) which were 
mainly attributed to inadequate blending (c1-c3) and the failures of raw materials weighing 
systems (c4-c27). The adverse effects of c1-c27 is on the fluctuations of key quality 
parameters such as lime saturation (LSF) and coating (CF) factors as shown in Figure 14. 
LSF is a measure of the lime content of kiln feed. In essence, the higher the LSF, the greater 
the percentage of un-combined lime which will require additional heat energy to burn. While 
it is recommended to maintain substantial LSF values, it is crucial to control the amount of 
free lime due to its ability to continuously trap moisture and cause cracks in cement 
structures. Looking at Figure 14(a), LSF values within the six weeks preceding K1 brick 
incident constantly exceeded the target values. The CF shown in Figure 14(b) is a measure of 
how well K1 refractory bricks in the burning zone are protected by the layer of coating 
formed by molten clinker. For CF, the plant’s target of 26-30 was not maintained.         
 
The success of FTAs is a function of the familiarity of the failure investigation team, which is 
perhaps the reason why there is a brainstorming element to most FTAs. RBDs on the other 
hand provide a means of further exposing the interactions between the various causal 
elements so that system vulnerabilities can be easily identified. For each the resultant fault 
trees (Figures 10-12), an equivalent RBD (Figures 15-17) was also developed based on the 
rules defined by Labib and Harris [27]. In addition to the individual RBDs, a global RBD that 
integrates the individual equivalent RBDs is also shown in Figure 18 so that the interface 
between the different classes of failure causes can be easily visualised. The integrated RBD 
depicts a very fragile interaction between the different events, owing to the significant 
number of associated series structures. The causal factors in the RBD are mostly related to 
the poor culture of maintenance and operations in the plant, although it can also be argued 
that a more recent K1 burner pipe design with deflection measurement capabilities will aid 
the early detection of misalignment. 
 
 5. Recommendations from the failure investigation team 
A significant number of the current investigation team members were also involved in the 
initial failure investigation using the Apollo method. However, unlike the earlier exercise that 
purely dwelled on external factors (outward-looking) such as brick design and therefore 
recommended the usual action of refractory brick replacement, the current investigation 
based on FTA and RBD provided more insights about inherent lapses in the maintenance, 
operation and quality practices within the plant. Therefore, Table 2 provides an action plan 
that encompasses vital recommendations that could effectively minimise future occurrence of 
the chronic K1 refractory brick failure at the case study plant.   
 
6. Conclusions 
In general terms, failures of critical industrial assets can either be attributed to how the asset 
was made (design integrity) or its usage (maintenance and operation management strategy). 
Systems analysis techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and reliability block diagram 
(RBD) have been immensely used to generate valuable lessons from crucial industrial 
failures. However, the current body of literature depicts that most of the applications of these 
techniques focus on the assessment of design risks and far less of operation and maintenance. 
Using a case study cement plant, the current paper performs qualitative FTA and RBD 
analysis for a chronic rotary kiln refractory brick failure. While the case study cement plant 
has an already established failure investigation approach based on Apollo method of RCA, it 
was observed that the outcomes of their analysis have been unable to prevent future 
occurrences. Using FTA and RBD techniques, a cross-functional investigation team 
comprising of vey experienced engineers in the case study plant as well as academics have 
provided a more holistic understanding of the failure causing factors and their interrelations. 
The investigation team also provided various relevant and realistic recommendations that 
could either eliminate or significantly reduce the occurrence of kiln refractory brick failures.   
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Appendix 1. Basic events 
a1 burner misaligned from installation 
a2 bearing seal failure 
a3 excessive operating temperature 
a4 heat shield failure 
a5 compressed air line leakage 
a6 instrument air compressor failure 
a7 cooling system failure 
a8 graphite replacement interval too long 
a9 graphite holder failure 
a10 improper graphite storage 
b1 operator did not follow ramp-up procedure 
b2 operator did not follow ramp-down procedure 
b3 feed silo empty 
b4 feed silo canvas blockage 
b5 extraction air slides blockage 
 b6 leakage along extraction air line 
b7 extraction blower failure 
b8 lignite mill failure 
b9 shortage of lignite supply to mill 
b10 mill-to-K1 lignite transport pump failure 
b11 lignite storage hopper blockage 
b12 heavy fuel oil (HFO) supply shortage 
b13 HFO pump 1 failure 
b14 HFO pump 2 failure 
b15 HFO fuel pipes failure 
b16 boiler failure 
b17 steam pipe connector failure 
b18 damaged steam pipe 
b19 K1 induced draft fan failure 
b20 K1 motor bearings failure 
b21 K1 motor rotor failure 
b22 K1 motor stator failure 
b23 loss of power supply 
b24 coupling failure 
b25 main drive gearbox filter blockage 
b26 main drive gearbox oil pump failure 
b27 main drive gearbox hose failure 
b28 main drive gearbox radiator failure 
b29 main drive gearbox oil cooler leakage 
b30 main drive gearbox oil filtration failure 
b31 main drive gearbox oil particle contamination 
b32 main drive gearbox oil poor viscosity 
b33 girth/pinion gearbox filter blockage  
b34 girth/pinion gearbox oil pump failure 
b35 girth/pinion gearbox hose failure 
b36 girth/pinion gearbox radiator failure 
b37 girth/pinion gearbox oil cooler leakage 
b38 girth/pinion gearbox oil filtration failure 
b39 girth/pinion gearbox oil particle contamination 
b40 girth/pinion gearbox oil poor viscosity 
c1 blending compressor failure 
c2 blending silo canvas damaged 
c3 blending silo extraction air slide blockage 
c4 limestone weigh-belt load cells failure 
c5 torn limestone weigh-belt  
c6 limestone weigh-belt tracking roller failure 
c7 limestone weigh-belt tension bolt failure 
c8 limestone weigh-belt tail drum pads failure 
c9 limestone weigh-belt head drum pads failure 
c10 iron ore weigh-belt load cells failure 
c11 torn iron ore weigh-belt 
c12 iron ore weigh-belt tracking roller failure 
c13 iron ore weigh-belt tension bolt failure 
c14 iron ore weigh-belt tail drum pads failure 
c15 iron ore weigh-belt head drum pads failure 
 c16 sand weigh-belt load cells failure 
c17 torn sand ore weigh-belt 
c18 sand weigh-belt tracking roller failure 
c19 sand weigh-belt tension bolt failure 
c20 sand weigh-belt tail drum pads failure 
c21 sand weigh-belt head drum pads failure 
c22 alumina weigh-belt load cells failure 
c23 torn alumina ore weigh-belt 
c24 alumina weigh-belt tracking roller failure 
c25 alumina weigh-belt tension bolt failure 
c26 alumina weigh-belt tail drum pads failure 
c27 alumina weigh-belt head drum pads failure 
 
Appendix 2. Intermediate events 
IA1 burner misalignment 
IA2 high K1 vibration 
IA3 induced fan damper fails closed 
IA4 worn/cracked K1 tyre and support rollers 
IA5 damper arm stiff due to lack of lubricant 
IA6 inadequate power cylinder operating pressures 
IA7 overheating of K1 tyre and support rollers 
IA8 caked grease 
IA9 grease is molten 
IA10 poor lubrication (graphite blocks) 
IA11 ingress of dust 
IA12 insufficient graphite 
IA13 poor quality of graphite 
IA14 inadequate graphite-to-K1 tyre contact 
IA15 particle contamination 
IB1 thermal shock 
IB2 K1 disturbance 
IB3 rapid heating 
IB4 rapid cooling 
IB5 feed loss 
IB6 fuel loss 
IB7 loss of draft 
IB8 inadequate K1 speed 
IB9 storage silo extraction difficulty 
IB10 lignite fuel loss 
IB11 HFO fuel loss 
IB12 K1 electric motor 
IB13 lack of extraction air 
IB14 HFO pumps 
IB15 loss of steam temperature 
IB16 steam leakage 
IB17 K1 gearbox 
IB18 main drive gearbox 
IB19 girth/pinion gearbox 
IB20 crack/wear/broken main drive gears 
 IB21 crack/wear/broken girth/pinion drive gears 
IB22 main drive gearbox overheating 
IB23 girth/pinion drive gearbox overheating 
IB24 poor lubrication of main drive gearbox 
IB25 poor lubrication of girth/pinion drive gearbox 
IB26 lubrication oil shortage (main drive gearbox) 
IB27 oil cooler failure (main drive gearbox) 
IB28 poor oil quality (main drive gearbox) 
IB29 lubrication oil shortage (girth/pinion drive gearbox) 
IB30 oil cooler failure (girth/pinion drive gearbox) 
IB31 poor oil quality (girth/pinion drive gearbox) 
IC1 poor raw material quality 
IC2 poor K1 design/manufacturing quality 
IC3 non-homogenous K1 feed 
IC4 inadequate blending 
IC5 raw materials weighing system malfunction 
IC6 limestone weighing system malfunction 
IC7 iron ore weighing system malfunction 
IC8 sand weighing system malfunction 
IC9 alumina weighing system malfunction 
IC10 misaligned limestone weigh-belt 
IC11 misaligned iron ore weigh-belt 
IC12 misaligned sand weigh-belt 
IC13 misaligned alumina weigh-belt 
 
Appendix 3. Undeveloped events 
UA1 programmable logic controller failure 
UA2 K1 tyre and support rollers misalignment 
UA3 poor quality of tyre and support rollers  
UA4 poor graphite manufacturing process 
UB1 poor air-to-fuel ratio 
UB2 K1 motor winding 
UB3 main drive gearbox bearing failure 
UB4 excessive main drive gearbox vibration 
UB5 girth/pinion drive gearbox bearing failure 
UB6 excessive girth/pinion drive gearbox vibration 
UB7 poor quality of main drive gearbox gears 
UB8 poor quality of girth/pinion drive gearbox gears 
UB9 main drive gearbox cooling system failure 
UB10 girth/pinion drive gearbox cooling system failure 
UC1 K1 concentricity/ovality 
UC2 K1 axial run-out 
  
 
 
 
 
 
